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 Abstract:
Ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) are small (typically physician owned) healthcare facilities 
that specialize in performing outpatient surgeries and therefore compete against hospitals for 
patients. Physicians who own ASCs could treat their most profitable patients at their ASCs and 
less profitable patients at hospitals. This paper asks if the profitability of an outpatient surgery 
impacts where a physician performs the surgery. Using a sample of Medicare patients from the 
National Survey of Ambulatory Surgery, we find that higher profit surgeries do have a higher 
probability of being performed at an ASC compared to a hospital. After controlling for surgery 
type, a 10% increase in a surgery's profitability is associated with a 1.2 to 1.4 percentage point 
increase in the probability the surgery is performed at an ASC. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & 
Sons, Ltd. 
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What is the impact of profitability on whether a physician performs a surgery at an ambulatory 
surgery center (ASC) or a hospital outpatient department (HOPD)? A physician with ownership 
in an ASC may treat his most profitable patients at an ASC and his least profitable patients at an 
HOPD. This type of cherry picking (or cream skimming) behavior would maximize a physician's 
income because he receives a share of the facility fee his patients pay the ASC, but receives none 
of the facility fee his patients would pay the HOPD. However, this behavior could reduce the 
profitability of HOPDs. This could be problematic since hospitals claim to subsidize certain 
healthcare services, like uncompensated care, with the profit earned from their HOPD (Abelson, 
2004). 
 
An ASC differs from a hospital due to its small size and the limited number of healthcare 
services it offers. ASCs provide outpatient surgery and few of the additional services a hospital 
might provide, such as inpatient surgery or emergency room services. As described by MedPAC 
(2004, 2009), from 1997 to 2006, roughly 94% of ASCs were for-profit, 99% were freestanding 
clinics, and 88% were located in urban areas. The number of ASCs has steadily grown, from 
2462 facilities in 1997 to 4700 in 2006. Exit of ASCs has been minimal, with an average of 1.7% 
of facilities exiting annually during this time. According to Casalino et al. (2003), in 2001, 3371 
Medicare-certified ASCs competed for patients amongst themselves and approximately 3859 
HOPDs. 
 
ASCs also differ from hospitals in that groups of physicians typically own the facility. These 
physicians face complex decisions regarding how many and which patients to treat at an ASC 
versus a hospital. Besides profit, a physician might find performing surgeries at an ASC 
desirable if the ASC offers a more convenient location than the hospital, nicer amenities, a more 
comfortable setting, or greater flexibility in scheduling procedures. Physician-owners' decisions 
about which patients to treat at their ASCs as opposed to hospitals could be influenced by both 
economic and non-economic considerations. They could maximize profits by treating patients for 
whom the profit margin is the highest at their ASCs. Alternatively, they could maximize patient 
outcomes by treating the patients who are the sickest or most at risk for complications at the 
HOPD, which has better resources to take care of patients in critical condition. Most likely, 
physicians optimize along both these dimensions. 
 
ASCs are potentially socially beneficial for multiple reasons. First, by providing competition to 
hospitals, the presence of ASCs could lead to lower market prices, improved quality of care, or 
both. Next, ASCs could reduce healthcare expenditures as they perform outpatient surgeries at a 
lower cost than hospitals because they do not have the same overhead (Kelly, 2003). Medicare 
accounts for an ASC's lower overhead by providing lower reimbursement rates for many of the 
surgeries performed at ASCs compared to those performed at HOPDs.1 Additionally, ASCs can 
provide greater convenience for both patients and physicians. If physicians act as perfect agents 
for patients, the ability to sort patients between the two locations on the basis of patients' needs 
and preferences would lead to welfare gains. 
 
However, the incentive problems created by physician ownership of ASCs could have adverse 
effects. First, inefficiencies in health-care delivery would result if physicians assign patients to 
hospitals or ASCs on the basis of profitability instead of patient needs. Second, cherry picking by 
physicians could reduce the profitability of HOPDs, impacting hospitals' ability to provide 
unprofitable services such as charity care. Anecdotal evidence suggests that ASCs have the 
potential to cause hospitals financial harm. For example, an administrator of a hospital in St. 
Louis, Missouri claimed that between 2000 and 2005, the percentage of the hospital's revenue 
coming from outpatient services, which tend to be the most profitable, fell from 52 to 31%. The 
administrator contended that the primary reason for the decline was the opening of a nearby ASC 
that specialized in orthopedic surgery (Feldstein, 2006). As reported by Casalino et al. (2003), in 
its first quarter financial report from 2003 the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) (which at 
the time owned over 350 hospitals and other healthcare facilities) attributed one third of its lower 
than expected earnings per share to the increase in competition from ASCs and physician-owned 
specialty hospitals. According to the authors, some hospital executives expressed concern that 
cherry picking by ASCs was hurting hospital profitability. However, these executives stated that 
‘they did not have evidence to demonstrate the extent of cherry picking, while medical group 
leaders denied that such selective referral is an objective for their facilities’. 
 
This paper examines the link between physician profit motives and surgery location by 
estimating the relationship between the profitability of a surgical procedure and the probability 
the procedure is performed at an ASC instead of a hospital. We utilize the National Survey of 
Ambulatory Surgery (NSAS), which contains information on over 86 000 outpatient surgeries 
performed on Medicare patients, along with information from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) that describes the profitability of each surgery. We estimate a positive 
relationship between the profitability of a surgery and the probability a physician performs the 
surgery at an ASC using models with controls for patient characteristics and year-fixed effects. 
This result is robust to the use of two different profit measures as well as the inclusion of 
controls for surgery type, state, and whether the procedure is performed in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA). We conclude that a 10% increase in profitability is associated with a 1.2 
to 1.4 percentage point increase in the probability a physician performs a procedure at an ASC. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While no previous studies have estimated the relationship between profitability and whether a 
patient receives treatment at an ASC or hospital, some research examines other determinants of 
surgical location as well as the effect of ASCs on hospital volume. Wynn et al. (2004) found that 
patients undergoing cataract surgery at an HOPD were more likely to be female, older, African 
American, and Medicaid-eligible compared to those treated at an ASC. Patients treated at a 
hospital also suffered from more risk factors, such as hypertension or diabetes. Patients 
undergoing colonoscopy at an ASC or HOPD were not found to differ in their distribution of 
gender, age, or race, although patients treated at a hospital were more likely to be disabled and 
Medicaid-eligible. Also, for both categories of surgery, patients undergoing multiple procedures 
were more likely to be treated at an ASC rather than at a hospital. Wynn et al.'s findings suggest 
that both profit motives (represented by Medicaid-eligibility) and patient health (represented by 
risk factors and disabilities) impact the surgery location decision. Gabel et al. (2008) found that 
physicians with ownership in ASCs were more likely to refer insured patients to the facilities 
they owned and Medicaid patients to hospitals.2 Bian and Morrisey (2007) found that an 
increase in the number of ASCs per 100 000 people in an MSA was associated with a decrease in 
hospital outpatient surgery volume but no change in inpatient surgery volume. The reduction in 
outpatient volume would mean lower profits unless hospitals substitute toward higher-margin 
procedures. 
 
A related literature examines the impact of specialty hospitals on general hospitals. Specialty 
hospitals share similarities with ASCs, such as physician ownership and the provision of 
specialized services, so their effects on hospitals may mirror those of ASCs to some degree. 
Barro et al. (2006) showed that markets with specialty hospitals are associated with lower 
expenditures for cardiac care without significant changes in mortality, for all hospitals in a 
market, not just the specialty hospital. However, those authors and Greenwald et al. (2006) found 
that specialty hospitals treated healthier patients than general hospitals. In a similar paper, Carey 
et al. (2009) looked at entry of specialty hospitals and found that hospitals facing competition 
from specialty hospitals increased their service offerings in response to entry, particularly in the 
case of cardiac services. Finally, Mitchell (2008) reported that after obtaining ownership in 
specialty hospitals, physicians changed their clinical behavior by increasing the uses of certain 
healthcare services for injured workers with back and spine disorders. 
 
3. DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF PROFIT VARIABLES 
Our primary data source is the NSAS, which includes a sample of patients insured by Medicare 
who underwent outpatient surgery at either hospitals or ASCs in the United States from 1994 
through 1996 and also 2006.3 The survey collected the following information for each surgery: 
whether the patient received surgery at a hospital or ASC; the month and year of the surgery; the 
patient's age, gender, discharge status, source of payment, anesthesia information, diagnoses 
codes, and surgical procedure codes. 
 
To calculate the profitability of a patient's surgery from the perspective of a physician with 
ownership in an ASC, we determine the facility fee an ASC collects and an estimate of the cost it 
incurs for performing a surgery. The facility fee represents the payments for the non-physician 
inputs into a surgery such as nursing care, pharmaceuticals, and supplies. The ASC facility fee 
for each surgery comes from the CMS website (CMS, 2009). Although it does not apply to the 
data in this paper, in 2008 CMS instituted a new reimbursement system where the ASC facility 
fee for a particular procedure is roughly equal to 65% of the corresponding HOPD facility fee. 
Between the mid 1980s and 2008, CMS assigned one of nine different payment rates to a large 
set of procedures (2464 in 2004) that were performed at ASCs. Over time, CMS adjusted the 
facility fee occasionally to account for inflation. Payments were also adjusted for geographic 
factors, although our data do not contain enough detailed geographic indicators to compute these 
adjustments.4 Additionally, if multiple procedures were performed during one surgical 
encounter, the facility received the full payment for the procedure with the highest 
reimbursement rate and half the payment for the additional procedures. During this time, CMS 
reimbursed hospital outpatient departments very differently. Before 2000, hospitals were 
reimbursed on a ‘cost plus’ system. In August 2000, CMS switched to a prospective payment 
system that assigned reimbursement rates to each surgery based on the estimated cost of each 
surgery rather than grouping large numbers of surgeries into nine payment groups as with ASC 
reimbursement. 
 
During the time period of our analysis, Medicare reimbursed all the procedures performed at 
ASCs within a category at the same rate. However, these surgeries did not necessarily cost the 
same amount to perform, so certain procedures were more profitable than others. In particular, 
two of the nine categories contain over half of the surgeries Medicare allows ASCs to perform. 
The surgeries within these categories are very diverse, creating variability in the profitability of 
each surgery. 
 
To determine an ASC's profit from performing a surgery, the ASC's cost of performing that 
surgery must also be known. Virtually, no cost data exist regarding surgeries performed at ASCs, 
so we use indirect estimates of surgical costs.5 Since 2000, CMS has annually estimated the 
median cost of performing a particular surgery at an HOPD. While the median cost of 
performing a surgery at an HOPD differs in absolute terms from the median cost of performing 
that surgery at an ASC, the relative cost between the ASC and the HOPD should be similar for 
most surgeries. This assumption comes from MedPAC's (2004) suggestion to Congress that 
CMS align the reimbursement rates for ASCs and HOPDs. As they stated in the report, 
 
‘Using similar procedure groups and relative weights in the ASC and HOPD payment 
systems would make it easier to align rates for the same services across settings. 
Although the actual rates might not be the same in each setting, the relative payment 
difference between a colonoscopy and upper gastrointestinal endoscopy, for example, 
would be similar in each site of care.’ 
 




The numerator represents the total reimbursement a facility receives for surgical encounter i in 
year t, which may or may not include multiple procedures. This reimbursement consists of the 
full facility fee FacFeeiht for the procedure with the highest reimbursement (identified by 
subscript h), plus 50% of the facility fee for each of x additional procedures. The denominator 
HOPDMedianCostiht represents the median cost of performing the procedure with the highest 
reimbursement at a hospital, as calculated by CMS using hospital cost-to-charge ratios specific to 
each hospital's cost centers. We do not add in costs for secondary procedures because the CMS 
cost estimates represent the cost of the non-physician inputs into surgery, so it is unlikely that 
performing an additional procedure during a surgical encounter increases the costs by 50% of the 
cost estimate for that procedure. Ignoring the costs for the secondary procedure is not critical to 
our results: the results remain very similar if we add in 25, 50, or 75% of the costs for secondary 
procedures, or if we exclude reimbursements from secondary procedures.6 
 
As mentioned previously, CMS only began computing the median costs in 2000, while the 
NSAS data consist of the years 1994–1996 and 2006. For 2006, we use the 2006 CMS cost 
information (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2006). For 1994–1996, we estimate the 
costs using the 2000 CMS cost information through the following formula (Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services, 2001): 
 
where t = 1994, 1995, or 1996;  is the consumer price index (CPI) for medical care in year 
t; and  is the average CPI for medical care over the last six months of 1999 and the 
first six months of 2000 (the 12 months CMS used to compute the 2000 costs). Equation (2) 
therefore approximates the ratio of the cost of performing surgery in 1994–1996 to the cost of 
performing surgery in 2000 with the ratio of the price of medical care in 1994–1996 to the price 
of medical care in 2000, effectively adjusting the median cost to year t dollars. 
An alternative measure of profitability comes from a proposed rate change CMS tried to 
implement in 1998. CMS attempted without success to update the aforementioned Medicare 
reimbursement rates for ASCs – which were based on 1986 costs – several times during the 
1990s. In 1998, CMS constructed a new method for grouping outpatient surgeries, the 
Ambulatory Payment Classification (APC). CMS grouped procedures into an APC that were 
clinically similar and had similar costs. The APC system divided roughly 2464 ASC approved 
surgeries into 137 reimbursement categories rather than the 9 that were used. Compared to the 
current ASC reimbursement system, reimbursements for each APC category should be relatively 
closer to the actual cost of performing a surgery from that APC. CMS never implemented this 
system, but they did publish the proposed reimbursement rates (Health Care Financing 
Administration, 1998). If the proposed reimbursement rates are a good estimate of how much it 
actually costs to perform a surgery at an ASC, the ratio between the actual and proposed 
reimbursement rate provides an estimate of the profitability of a surgery. We therefore define 
 
where ProposedPayRateiht is the proposed reimbursement rate of the procedure performed at the 
surgical encounter with the highest reimbursement rate. We approximate the costs in 1994–1996 
and 2006 with the 1998 proposed reimbursement system using an equation analogous to (2): 
 
where t = 1994, 1995, 1996, or 2006 and  is the CPI for medical care in 1998. 
 
A limitation of our data is that the NSAS classifies each patient's surgery using The International 
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) system. However, 
Medicare reimburses surgeries using the Current Procedural Terminology Fourth Edition (CPT) 
system. That is, if a patient had an arthroscopy in the NSAS, the code for the arthroscopy in the 
NSAS would not match with the code for the arthroscopy in the Medicare data that describes the 
profitability of the surgery. We obtained a crosswalk from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research that links these two coding systems, but the crosswalk does not provide a one-to-one 
match for all codes. A particular ICD-9-CM code may be associated with multiple CPT codes. If 
a code matches to multiple CPT codes, the reimbursement and cost information for all the 
matched CPT codes are averaged so the ICD-9-CM code is reimbursed at that average amount 
and costs that average amount to perform.7 After dropping outliers, our sample contains 86 551 
observations represented by 506 different ICD-9 codes.8 Most of the sample occurs from 1994 to 
1996, as only 5058 observations are from 2006. 
 
We present the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis in Table I. About 55% of 
the surgeries in our sample were performed at an ASC. The average profit margin is 1.4 using 
the profrate measure and 1.9 using the paydiffratio measure. Surgeries on the eye and digestive 
system are overwhelmingly the most common types of procedures performed. 
Table I. Summary statistics 
Variable   Mean (standard deviation) 
Treated at an ASC  0.546 
     (0.498) 
Age    75.423 
     (6.592) 
Male    0.403 
     (0.491) 
Multiple Procedures  0.518 
     (0.500) 
Second Insurance: Private 0.639 
     (0.480) 
Second Insurance: Medicaid 0.080 
     (0.271) 
Second Insurance: Other 0.026 
     (0.160) 
Number of Diagnoses  1.536 
     (1.014) 
General Anesthesia 0.032 
    (0.176) 
Nervous  0.009 
    (0.096) 
Eye   0.557 
    (0.497) 
Ear   0.004 
    (0.065) 
Nose/Mouth  0.008 
    (0.087) 
Respiratory  0.013 
    (0.114) 
Cardiovascular 0.006 
    (0.075) 
Digestive  0.255 
    (0.436) 
Urinary  0.059 
    (0.235) 
Male Genital  0.006 
    (0.079) 
Female Genital 0.006 
    (0.079) 
Musculoskeletal 0.037 
    (0.189) 
Integumentary  0.032 
    (0.175) 
ProfRate  1.434 
    (0.509) 
PayDiffRatio  1.892 
    (0.381) 
N   86 551 
Unique ICD9 codes 506 
 
4. METHODS 
We estimate linear probability models of the following form: 
 
ASCit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if patient i in year t was treated at an ASC and 0 if he 
was treated at a hospital, while profmeasitrepresents either profrateit or paydiffratioit. The model 
also includes a set of control variables Controls and year-fixed effects τt, while εitis the error 
term. We compute clustered standard errors at the ICD-9 code-by-year level to account for 
possible correlation in unobservable determinants of surgery location within ICD-9 code-year 
groups. 
We use a linear probability model with a logarithmic functional form for the profit measure 
because this specification allows for straightforward interpretation, as β is the approximate effect 
of a 100% increase in profitability on the probability a patient is treated at an ASC. The 
percentage interpretation gives the magnitude of the change in profitability and also makes the 
estimates for profrate andpaydiffratio more comparable than they would be otherwise. Our 
results are robust to the use of probit models and also models that use the level instead of the log 
of profitability.9 
We include several controls, many of which are motivated by the findings of Wynn et al. (2004). 
First, we control for gender, age, and age squared. An older patient is likely unhealthier than a 
younger patient and may therefore be a worse candidate for treatment at an ASC. Next, we 
include the patient's number of diagnosis codes and number of diagnosis codes squared since 
more diagnosis codes likely indicates worse health. We also include dummy variables for 
whether the patient received general anesthesia and whether he underwent multiple procedures. 
Both variables are indications that the procedure is relatively complex and therefore less likely to 
occur at an ASC. We also control for whether in addition to Medicare the patient paid for his 
procedure with private insurance, Medicaid, or another type of insurance. These variables should 
help proxy for income, since Medicaid recipients are generally poor while higher income 
individuals are more likely to have private insurance. 
Given the difficulties in constructing profitability measures as discussed in Section 3, 
measurement error in these variables is a concern. While measurement error will reduce the 
precision of our estimation, it is not clear that our estimators will be systematically biased.10 We 
address the issue of measurement error by using the two different measures of profitability. If the 
results are similar using both measures, it will increase our confidence that bias from 
measurement error is not driving our results. 
Apart from measurement error, in Equation (5) our estimator of β is unbiased under the 
assumption that profitability is uncorrelated with the error term. This assumption would be 
invalid if surgeries performed on certain body parts or systems are more profitable than others 
and also more amenable to being performed at ASCs for reasons aside from profitability. 
Table II reports the mean profit margins and proportion of surgeries performed at an ASC by 
surgery type. We group surgeries into those related to the: nervous system, eye, ear, nose/mouth, 
respiratory system, cardiovascular system, digestive system, urinary system, male genital, female 
genital, musculoskeletal system, integumentary, and also surgeries related to miscellaneous 
procedures. Among these 13 categories, eye surgeries have by far the highest probability of 
occurring at an ASC and are also among the most profitable. While this may partially reflect a 
causal relationship, unobservable factors such as the low probability of serious complications 
likely contribute to the high proportion of eye surgeries that occur at an ASC. Since over half of 
the sample consists of eye procedures, failing to account for surgery category may result in a 
spurious positive relationship between procedure profitability and the probability it is performed 
at an ASC. We therefore also estimate models that include a set of surgery type-by-year effects, 
created by interacting each of the surgery type dummy variables by each of the year-fixed 
effects. We use surgery type-by-year-fixed effects instead of merely surgery type-fixed effects in 
order to allow the impacts of surgery types on the probability of treatment at an ASC to change 
over time. We choose that approach to account for the significant changes in ASC prevalence 
during our sample period. 
Table II. Mean and standard deviations for key variables by surgery type 
Variable ASC ProfRate PayDiffRatio 
Nervous 0.270 0.971 1.516 
  (0.444) (0.361) (0.473) 
Variable ASC ProfRate PayDiffRatio 
Eye 0.684 1.498 1.986 
  (0.465) (0.510) (0.324) 
Ear 0.465 0.922 1.614 
  (0.499) (0.283) (0.583) 
Nose/Mouth 0.295 1.052 1.607 
  (0.456) (0.369) (0.551) 
Respiratory 0.230 1.348 1.556 
  (0.421) (0.326) (0.363) 
Cardiovascular 0.060 0.812 1.376 
  (0.238) (0.318) (0.652) 
Digestive 0.390 1.561 1.825 
  (0.488) (0.453) (0.346) 
Urinary 0.426 1.066 1.832 
  (0.495) (0.247) (0.409) 
Male Genital 0.527 1.791 2.168 
  (0.500) (0.747) (0.331) 
Female Genital 0.235 0.941 1.583 
  (0.425) (0.202) (0.313) 
Variable ASC ProfRate PayDiffRatio 
Musculoskeletal 0.395 0.935 1.608 
  (0.489) (0.266) (0.449) 
Integumentary 0.278 1.196 1.775 
  (0.445) (0.555) (0.512) 
Miscellaneous 0.404 0.878 1.441 
  (0.494) (0.366) (0.369) 
 
In the models with surgery type-fixed effects, we identify β on the basis of variation in 
profitability between procedures performed on the same body part or system. While this should 
reduce omitted variable bias, it also eliminates much of the potentially meaningful variation in 
profitability, raising the issues of over controlling and multicollinearity. Over controlling occurs 
if we control for the mechanisms through which the independent variable of interest affects the 
dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 203–204). Since profitability should not determine the 
part of the body on which a surgery is performed (instead, the opposite is probably true), we do 
not expect that over controlling is a problem in our analysis.11 Multicollinearity does not bias 
coefficient estimators but does inflate standard errors. If the multicollinearity is severe, estimates 
may be too imprecise to be useful. To assess the extent of multicollinearity in our estimation, we 
compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the profitability measure.12 Researchers typically 
conclude that multicollinearity is a problem if the VIF is greater than 10 (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 
99). 
 
Controlling for surgery type should, to some degree, also address the concern that the NSAS data 
do not contain information on which physician performs each surgery, preventing the inclusion 
of controls for the physician's level of ownership in ASCs. This omission could bias our 
estimators upward since financially motivated physicians may be both more likely to perform 
profitable procedures and also to own a share of an ASC and therefore perform surgeries there. 
Controlling for surgery type should reduce the extent of this bias because a financially motivated 
physician's best opportunity to influence the profitability of the procedures he performs lies in 
his choice of specialty, and surgery type-fixed effects are similar to physician specialty-fixed 
effects. 
 
We estimate additional models to address the issue that the majority of our sample consists of 
data from 1994 to 1996, raising the question of the applicability of the results. There is little 
reason to expect that physicians would have responded to financial incentives in the mid 1990s 
but not today, or vice versa. A body of research spanning many years suggests that physicians 
respond to financial incentives, so this response does not appear to be limited to a specific time 
period.13 While we therefore feel it is unlikely that the direction of the effect of profitability on 
P(ASC) has changed since the 1990s, the magnitude may be different given the changes in ASC 
market structure. We estimate two additional models in order to examine this possibility. First, 
we include the interaction of profitability with an indicator variable equal to one if the year is 
2006. If the interaction term is significant, this would provide evidence that the effect has 
changed over time. Second, we restrict the sample to the 2006 wave and compare the coefficient 
estimate to the estimate obtained using all four years. 
 
In a final robustness check, we account for unobservable determinants of surgery location that 
vary by state and area population density by including state-fixed effects and a binary variable 
reflecting whether the surgery takes place in an MSA. In particular, these variables proxy for the 
average ASC ownership share of physicians in the area and therefore further addresses the 
concern of bias from omitting physician ownership share. ASC presence varies considerably by 
state, suggesting that average physician ownership share also varies considerably by state since 
these characteristics should be highly correlated.14 Similarly, ASCs are much more prevalent in 
urban than rural areas, so average physician ownership share is likely higher in urban areas. We 
suspect that if bias from omitting physician ownership stakes is a serious problem in our 
analysis, including state effects and the MSA dummy will impact our results to some degree, 
although not as much as if we were able to control for ownership stakes directly. Since the public 
use NSAS data do not contain geographic identifiers narrower than Census region, for the state 
effects regressions we use the restricted NSAS data, graciously made available by the U.S. 
Census Bureau and accessed at the Triangle Census Research Data Center in Durham, NC. The 
restricted data and MSA variable were only available for the 2006 wave, so our regressions that 
include state-fixed effects and MSA consist of only that year.15 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table III displays the coefficient estimates for the profitability variables from the regressions 
discussed in Section 4. The left half of the table uses profrate as the profitability measure, while 
the right half uses paydiffratio. Column (1) reports the results from the estimation of Equation 
(5), while column (2) adds the surgery type-by-year effects, column (3) adds the interaction term, 
column (4) restricts the sample to 2006, and column (5) adds the state effects and MSA dummy. 
At the bottom of the table, we also report the number of observations, R2, and VIF for the 
profitability variable. 
Table III. Effect of profitability on the probability that the patient was treated at an ASC 
  Profit measure = ln(profrate) Profit measure=ln(paydiffratio) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Robust standard errors, clustered by ICD9 code-year, are in brackets. †Significant at 10%; *significant at 
5%; **significant at 1%. 
Profit 0.158 0.120 0.122 0.125 0.131 0.237 0.135 0.135 0.241 0.285 
  [0.064]* [0.043]** [0.045]** [0.075]† [0.064]* [0.098]* [0.066]* [0.068]* [0.135]† [0.128]* 
Profit*Year 2006 — — −0.057 — — — — −0.018 — — 
      [0.082]         [0.124]     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No No No No Yes No No No No 
Year-by-Surgical-Type 
Fixed Effects 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects and 
MSA 
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Years All All All 2006 2006 All All All 2006 2006 
Observations 86 551 86 551 86 551 5058 5058 86 551 86 551 86 551 5058 5058 
R2 0.145 0.195 0.195 0.134 0.322 0.142 0.192 0.192 0.137 0.327 
VIF 1.090 1.445 1.502 1.656 1.815 1.338 1.527 1.592 1.520 1.683 
 
Robust standard errors, clustered by ICD9 code-year, are in brackets. †Significant at 10%; 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
Table IV. Full regression output for preferred specification (all years; year-by-surgical-
type fixed effects) 
1. Robust standard errors, clustered by ICD9 code-year, are in brackets. †Significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significa   
1%. Effects of a 1 standard deviation increase are in parentheses. 
Ln(profrate) 0.120 — 
  (0.037)   
  [0.043]**   
ln(paydiffratio) — 0.135 
    (0.025) 
    [0.066]* 
Age in Years 0.016 0.017 
  (−0.009) (−0.008) 
  [0.006]* [0.006]** 
Age Squared −0.0001 −0.0001 
  [0.00004]** [0.00004]** 
Male 0.014 0.012 
  [0.006]* [0.006]* 
Multiple Procedures 0.012 −0.006 
  [0.021] [0.030] 
Second Insurance: Private 0.117 0.119 
  [0.011]** [0.011]** 
Second Insurance: Medicaid 0.107 0.110 
  [0.015]** [0.015]** 
Second Insurance: Other 0.105 0.108 
  [0.022]** [0.022]** 
Number of Diagnoses −0.158 −0.159 
  (−0.114) (−0.114) 
  [0.019]** [0.018]** 
Number of Diagnoses Squared 0.009 0.009 
  [0.002]** [0.002]** 
General Anesthesia −0.083 −0.083 
  [0.028]** [0.028]** 
 
In all regressions, the coefficient estimates for the profit measure variables are significant and 
positive, implying that as a patient's surgical procedure increases in profitability, he has a greater 
probability of receiving treatment at an ASC. In the regressions without the surgery type-by-year 
effects, a 10% increase in profitability increases P(ASC) by 1.6 percentage points using profrate 
as the profit measure and 2.4 percentage points using paydiffratio. Column (2) shows that 
including surgery type-by-year effects shrinks the estimated effects and makes them less 
sensitive to the choice of profit measure. A 10% increase in profitability now increases P(ASC) 
by 1.2 percentage points using profrate and 1.4 percentage points using paydiffratio. Including 
surgery type-by-year effects does not lead to a multicollinearity problem, as the VIFs are under 
two. In fact, including them improves the precision of the estimates, reflecting the strong 
correlation between body part/system and surgery location. We therefore prefer the model with 
the surgery type-by-year effects to the model without them, and we include them in all 
subsequent regressions. 
 
As seen in columns (3) and (4), we cannot conclude that the average effect of profitability on 
P(ASC) changed between the mid-1990s and 2006. The interaction term between the profit 
variable and the year 2006 indicator is highly insignificant using both profit measures. The 
coefficient estimate for profrate obtained with the 2006 subsample is virtually identical to the 
estimate obtained with the full sample. When paydiffratio is used the estimate is larger with the 
2006 subsample, but the estimate from the full sample is within one standard error so we cannot 
conclude that this difference reflects anything other than sampling error. 
 
Column (5) shows that adding the state effects and MSA dummy has little impact on the 
coefficient estimates reported in column (4) but increases the R2 considerably.16 These results 
suggest that the probability an outpatient surgery is performed at an ASC depends heavily on 
location – likely because of the variation in ASC presence between different areas – but that 
location does not influence the profitability measures conditional on the controls. 
 
In Table IV, we report more complete regression output for our preferred specification, which 
corresponds to column (2) from Table III.17 The results for the controls are in most cases as 
expected and consistent with the findings of Wynn et al. (2004). The marginal effect of age on 
P(ASC) becomes negative after about 70 years of age and is therefore negative for most of our 
sample. Men are slightly more likely than women to be treated at an ASC. Patients undergoing 
multiple procedures in one surgical encounter are more likely to be admitted into an ASC. 
Having a second form of insurance is associated with an increase in P(ASC), while an increase in 
the number of diagnosis codes reduces P(ASC). Receiving general anesthesia leads to a 
statistically significant reduction in P(ASC). 
 
We can use these results to evaluate the economic significance of the effect of profitability on 
surgery location by comparing it to the effects of the control variables. Since it is not obvious 
how a 10% increase in profitability compares in magnitude to a one unit increase in the control 
variables, we compute the effect of a one standard deviation increase at the mean for profitability 
as well as the other non-binary variables in the model – age and number of diagnosis codes. We 
report the effects of these one standard deviation increases in parentheses beneath the coefficient 
estimates. Increasing profitability by one standard deviation at the mean increases P(ASC) by 
2.5–3.7 percentage points. For comparison, a one standard deviation increase in age at the mean 
leads to a drop in P(ASC) of 0.8–0.9 percentage points. A one standard deviation increase in the 
number of diagnosis codes – which is a proxy for patient health – has a greater impact, 
decreasing P(ASC) by 11.4 percentage points. Our other control variables are dummies, so for 
them we focus on the coefficient estimates instead of standard deviation increases. The effect of 
a one standard deviation increase in profitability is stronger than the effects of being male and 
having multiple procedures, but weaker than the effects of having a second form of insurance 
and receiving general anesthesia (a proxy for procedure complexity).18 Overall, we conclude 
that profitability has an important impact on surgery location but is only one of several factors 
that play a role. In fact, patient health and procedure complexity may be more important 
determinants than profitability. The surgery location decision certainly appears more complex 
than physicians simply assigning their most profitable patients to an ASC and their least 




In this paper, we provide a first step in understanding how a surgical procedure's profitability 
impacts the decision of physicians to perform it at an ASC instead of a hospital. After controlling 
for surgery type, we find that a 10% increase in a patient's profit margin is associated with a 1.2 
to 1.4 percentage point increase in the probability a physician treats a patient at an ASC. Our 
results are robust to the use of two different profit measures and controls for state and whether 
the procedure was performed in an MSA. 
 
While our estimation of a positive effect is consistent with cherry picking behavior among 
physicians, it is also consistent with ASCs creating new demand for high-profit procedures, in 
which case the entry of ASCs would not financially hurt hospitals. Given Bian and Morrissey's 
(2007) finding that ASC entry does impact hospitals' provision of outpatient surgeries, we 
consider it unlikely that our results come completely from new demand without any effect on 
hospitals. Future research should attempt to disentangle the portions of the effect that can be 
attributed to cherry picking and new demand. 
 
Further, even if ASCs do reduce the average profitability of procedures performed by HOPDs, 
this does not necessarily mean that they reduce social welfare. Future research should also weigh 
potential losses from reduced hospital profitability (potentially leading to reduced provision of 
uncompensated care) against potential gains from the reduced cost of performing outpatient 
surgeries. Similar to specialty hospitals, ASCs could be introducing beneficial competition that 
would lower market prices without decreasing the level of quality. Also, ASCs may offer 
conveniences to physicians and patients that hospitals do not. 
 
An additional avenue for future research is to examine whether the results change after 
controlling for the operating physician's ownership stakes in ASC facilities. One approach would 
be to use data that includes the identity of the physician performing the procedure. This would 
allow for physician-fixed effects, which would eliminate bias from omitting ASC ownership 
stakes to the extent the stakes are constant over time. Another approach would be to control for 
ownership stakes directly, potentially using ownership information obtained from the state 
agencies that oversee the licensing of ASCs. Finally, future work should examine whether our 
results persist using more recent data and non-Medicare patients. 
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1 In 2004, 2150 Medicare outpatient procedures had a higher facility fee at hospitals compared to 
ASCs. 
 
2 More broadly, in the literature of how physicians respond to financial incentives, several 
economists have found that changes in price influence the quantity of healthcare services 
physicians provide. Rice et al. (1999) found that a reduction in Medicare physician fees caused 
physicians to treat more privately insured patients due to an increase in the relative payments 
physicians would receive. Yip (1998) found that, following a decline in the Medicare physician 
fee for performing Coronary Artery Bypass Grafts (CABGs), physicians performed more 
CABGs both among their privately insured patients and those patients insured by Medicare. In 
another related area of research, economists have examined whether physicians induce demand 
in health-care facilities that they own. Hillman et al. (1990) found that ‘doctors who own 
imaging machines ordered four times as many imaging tests as those referring to independent 
radiologists. Further, they charged more than independent radiologists for similarly complex 
procedures’. Mitchell and Sunshine (1992) found the same result for physicians who own 
radiation therapy facilities. These studies, however, do not distinguish between correlation and 
causality, so they cannot conclude whether these results reflect a profit motive or simply show 
that physicians who believe the most strongly in imaging are those most likely to invest in the 
equipment. 
 
3 The sampling frame for hospitals consisted of all non-institutional hospitals listed in the SMG 
Marketing Group/Verispan Hospital Market Database that were not operated by the federal 
government, had at least six beds, and had an average patient stay of less than 30 days. The 
sampling frame for ASCs consisted of facilities listed in the SMG Marketing Group/Verispan 
Freestanding Outpatient Surgery Center Database or the CMS Provider-of-Services file that were 
certified by CMS for Medicare participation, excluding those that specialized in dentistry, 
podiatry, abortion, family planning, or birthing. The NSAS is a complex survey, but we do not 
use sampling weights since they are not available in the 1994–1996 data. 
 
4 However, there is little reason to suspect that this will affect our conclusions. The state-fixed 
effects and MSA dummy variable discussed in Section 4 should reduce any resulting bias. 
 
5 CMS conducted ASC cost surveys in 1986 and 1994, but they did not keep records of these 
surveys. 
 
6 We do not present these results, but they are available on request. 
 
7 In cases where an ICD-9-CM code matches to multiple CPT codes, we construct the simple 
average of possible payment rates. 
 
8 We define an outlier as a patient above the 99th percentile or below the 1st percentile for either 
profit measure. Also, we require patients to have information for both profit variables to be 
included in the sample. 
 
9 Results from these models are available on request. 
 
10 Under the assumption that our observed profitability measures are uncorrelated with the 
extent of the measurement error, the estimators of β are unbiased but the standard errors will be 
inflated. Alternatively, if we assume that the actual profitability measures are uncorrelated with 
the extent of the measurement error, our estimators will be biased toward zero and the standard 
errors will again be inflated (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 318–320). Because our profitability measures 
are ratios instead of levels, there is no clear reason to suspect that both these assumptions are 
invalid. Therefore, it seems unlikely that measurement error will cause us to overestimate the 
effect of profitability on the probability a surgery is performed at an ASC. 
 
11 If physicians induce demand, profitability could influence whether or not a procedure is 
performed. However, conditional on the procedure being performed (and therefore being in the 
sample), profitability should not determine which body part the surgery targets. For example, if a 
patient needs eye surgery, a doctor cannot instead perform a digestive procedure simply because 
it is more profitable. 
 
12 VIF = 1/(1 − R2), where R2 is from the regression of the log of profitability on the other 
independent variables. 
 
13 For examples, see Mitchell (2008), Young et al. (2007), Conrad et al. (1998), Gruber and 
Owings (1996), Hemenway et al. (1990), Hillman et al. (1989), and Hickson et al. (1987). 
 
14 Southern and western states have the most ASCs per capita, likely because state policies in 
these areas allow for easier entry of ASCs, while northeast states have the fewest. A similar 
phenomenon is found in location of specialty hospitals as noted by the October 2003 report by 
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 2003). 
 
15 We also estimated models including region fixed effects using the public NSAS data from 
1994–1996. Adding region-fixed effects made virtually no difference to the coefficient estimates. 
These results are available on request. 
 
16 In unreported regressions (results available on request), we show that the results remain very 
similar if we add only the state effects or only the MSA variable, as opposed to adding them both 
at the same time. 
 
17 Full regression output from the other specifications is available on request. 
 
18 The strong impact of paying with a second form of insurance may itself reflect a profit 
motive, although if this was the case we would expect to find a larger difference between the 
effects of having private insurance and having Medicaid. Perhaps physicians feel that having any 
type of second insurance lowers the risk that payment will not be made. 
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